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Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO

August 22, 1967

Internal Security

CA-8150 of April 21, 1967; CA-9309 of June 5, 1967

1. The Embassy considers current procedures adequate to insure exchange of intelligence and viewpoints regarding internal security matters. The internal security sub-committee which was established prior to receipt of CA-8150 has been charged with the effective exchange of these matters on a regular basis, with keeping the country team advised on current and future guerrilla activities and to recommend such preventive measures as may be feasible and appropriate on the part of U.S. government agencies.
2. The CASP is being kept under review and will be updated as required.
3. The following is submitted in response to paragraph 5 of CA-9309.
4. A. Section 56 of the NIS dated April 1966 contains a comprehensive review of the Brazilian government intelligence activities at the federal, state and municipal levels and includes information as to functions, organization, administrative practices, methods of operation, relationships with each other, and their capabilities and effectiveness. This report has been reviewed and is considered valid with the exception of the personnel concerned which have changed with the administration.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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MILGP:WPRenny:ejb:gmh

(in draft) POL:HMIdkiff

MILGP:Gen.Linville
POL:RGahagen

DCM:Philip Reine

USARMA:Col.Moura
PSO:WFWeyland

EXEC:FCCarlucci

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5. The following comments provide a brief resume of some current and planned Brazilian and U.S. activities which bear directly on countering the insurgency potential in Brazil.

6. Brazilian security forces are fully appreciative of the insurgency potential in Brazil and are endeavoring at all levels to strengthen their capabilities and improve their effectiveness in dealing with any threat of this nature.

7. With the help of U.S. military and AID programs and advisors, the Brazilian Armed Forces and the Civil Police elements have made significant improvement in the counterinsurgency field. Current and planned programs will provide for further increases in capabilities and effectiveness.

8. The military service schools at all levels, including the National War College, have given increased emphasis and effort to lectures and courses in counterinsurgency. MILGP advisors are providing appropriate guidance and material from U.S. service training and educational sources. At the invitation of the Brazilian military authorities, Major General DuFuy, Special Assistant to the Chairman JCS, for counterinsurgency and special activities, recently lectured to both the National War College and the Army Command and Staff College.

9. At the highly rated jungle warfare training center in the upper Amazon a special counterinsurgency course is being initiated and at the request of the Brazilians, U.S. military advisors are collaborating in the formulation of the course with the training and instruction material being procured through the MAPT. Field units at all levels are also stepping up their instruction in this field as evidenced by increased requests to the MILGP advisors for training material.

10. The most substantive increases in COIN capability and effectiveness are resulting from MAP materiel programs in the areas of communications and mobility. Communication equipment currently being received is being used to initiate a modern, effective commnet between the Army area commands and between the commands and their field units. When complete this will provide, for the first time, a completely reliable net between the widely separated units in the military areas. Planned reorganization by the Brazilian Army into smaller more compact and effective mobile units with improved fixed and mobile communications and transport, as provided in part by MAP, will measurably increase the capability to react quickly and effectively against insurgency threats.

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11. The crack airborne unit in Rio, almost completely re-equipped, now has the capability, with the Air Force purchase of ten C-130 aircraft, of reinforcing outlying units or of dropping into isolated trouble spots anywhere in their vast territory within hours of an alert.
12. Military Intelligence Officers in outlying units have developed an effective reporting system involving the utilization of selected civilian elements of the rural areas who report events of intelligence interest in these areas. This is particularly effective since the military is held in high esteem by the majority of the rural population and any effort by insurgents to gain local ideological or logistic support would probably be immediately reported.
13. President Costa e Silva decreed in May of 1967 the establishment of an Army Intelligence Center which will give added emphasis to intelligence and counterintelligence training and develop greater capability in collection, evaluation and utilization of intelligence information. The U.S. Army intelligence advisor collaborates closely with the Army intelligence authorities both on this project and in a number of new courses currently underway in the present intelligence school.
14. U.S. Air Force counterinsurgency training teams have worked in-country with the Brazilian Air Force on techniques and procedures and although the FAB does not have an adequate COIN aircraft a number of C-47s, B-26s and T-6s have been incorporated into a COIN squadron and have a limited capability.
15. Extension courses are also an important element of U.S. contributions to Brazilian awareness and knowledge of counterinsurgency and associated subjects. There is currently a total of 371 officers enrolled in extension courses in COIN or related subjects while some 700 have already completed such studies.
16. In addition to the foregoing specific examples all Armed Forces units have a counterinsurgency responsibility and this subject is an important part of regular unit instruction and training.
17. This becomes particularly important when considered in the light of the approximately 100,000 conscripts who are turned back into civilian life each year. All of these young men undergo considerable indoctrination as to the purposes and procedures of Communist efforts and take with them a far better appreciation of how to recognize and deal with Communist guerrilla or other activities.

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18. The bulk of the remainder of the diminishing MAP material resources is planned for the communications/transportation areas. Brazilian purchases will complete equipment requirements in this high priority area.

19. The extensive civic action programs carried out by the Brazilians military forces in all of the outlying and isolated areas of Brazil must technically be classified as indirect aid to counterinsurgency; however, it is a vitally important and highly effective instrument in maintaining the government liaison with thousands of dwellers in isolated areas and in retaining the assurance that the government is in touch and can and will help and protect as required.

20. USAID public safety programs and advisors have provided essential assistance to the police organizations of ten of the most populous states of Brazil in efforts toward improved personnel selection, standards and training, communications systems and facilities and operational effectiveness.

21. During the past year more than 23,000 members of police agencies have completed local training courses strengthening and improving their capability and effectiveness in coping with threats of public disorder.

22. Of vital importance to the effective utilization of civil police forces has been the provision by USAID of communications equipped mobile units which have greatly enhanced the ability of the security forces of the recipient states to react quickly to any emergency.

23. Although the civil security forces are considered the first line of defense against a threat to public order, the less populated states in many cases do not have the necessary resources in manpower or equipment to police adequately the areas of responsibility. In these cases the Armed Forces are looked to to provide the necessary protection. The Army area commander concerned in coordination with the appropriate state authorities would provide the forces required.

24. USAID will continue the same type assistance through the programs which are planned to terminate in 1971 at which time it is anticipated that basic objectives will have been attained.

25. B. As is essentially reported in the CASP there exist groups at the present time both in and outside of Brazil which

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advocate the immediate use of armed violence, in the form of guerrilla movements, to overthrow the government of Brazil. However, it is believed that these groups individually do not have as yet either sufficient popular support, organization, funding, trained personnel or international contacts to mount successfully effective guerrilla activities within Brazil. Up to the present time none of these groups have given an indication of joining forces in guerrilla activities.

26. Since the March 1964 revolution, the majority of the acts of terrorism which have occurred in Brazil appear to be isolated incidents and do not appear as part of a coordinated plan toward guerrilla activities.

27. There have been a number of instances of minor insurgency against the GOB within the past three years in which ex-Deputy Leonel Brizolla has been cited as the motivating force. All of these activities have been quickly dispelled by Brazilian security forces and it can be noted that none of these efforts have received popular support.

28. Brazilian security forces are apprehensive of the guerrilla operations which are taking place in a number of neighboring countries as well as the activities of the exiles in Uruguay and the current Latin American Solidarity Organization conference underway in Cuba. However, they feel that they are competent to deal with any threat as currently foreseen.

29. Although Embassy access to the various dissident groups varies, coverage is augmented substantially by liaison with the Brazilian intelligence services. There is a high probability of the Embassy knowing in advance of PCB (Brazilian Communist Party, Soviet) participation in guerrilla activities and a good probability of advance knowledge as far as the CPB (Communist Party of Brazil, Chinese) and the AP (Ação Popular, students) are concerned. Coverage of exile activities is tenuous but improving as the liaison services increase their efforts in this area.

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